Saturday, April 29, 2017

Ushirikiano wa Malcolm X na Tanzania na Sababu zilizofanya Auliwe

Ushirikiano wa Malcolm X na Tanzania na Sababu zilizofanya Auliwe
Malcolm X aliuliwa tarehe 21 mwezi wa 2 mwaka 1965. Pichani Malcolm X anaonekana akiwa Dar es Salaam mwaka 64 na wanafunzi wa Marekani. Picha nyingine ni mwili wake ukiwa na matundu ya risasi kwenye moyo. Je kuna uhusiano wowote kati ya mauaji hayo na ushirikiano wake na Tanzania?
Kabla ya hajauliwa, Malcolm alianza kujenga urafiki mkubwa na Tanzania. Msafara wa Tanzania, wakati huo Tanganyika na Zanzibar, walimpa ushirikiano mkubwa OAU mwezi wa saba mwaka 64 huko Cairo. OAU ilimuunga mkono kwenye jitihada zake kupinga ubaguzi wa rangi nchini Marekani. Malcolm X alijenga ushirikiano na Tanzania kati ya mwezi wa saba mwaka 64 na mwezi wa pili mwaka 65. Uhusiano huo ulimleta Dar es Salaam mwezi wa kumi mwaka 64. Abdulrahman Babu kutoka Zanzibar ndio alikuwa chanzo kikubwa cha ushirikiano kati ya Malcolm X na serikali. Alipokuwa Dar es Salaam, Malcolm alifanya maongezi na viongozi mbali mbali wa serikali na chama. Alikutana na raisi Nyerere ikulu na kufanya maongezi ya karibu masaa matatu. Uhusiano huu kati yake na viongozi wa Tanzania uliendelea mwishoni wa mwaka 64. Maafisi wa upelelezi wa Marekani, FBI, walimfuata Malcolm mwezi wa 12 akitoka uwanja wa ndege New York ambapo walimuona akiwa na maafisi wa ubalozi wa Tanzania. Aliingia kwenye gari la maafisa wa ubalozi wa Tanzania na kuondoka kuelekea kwenye nyumba ya afisa mmoja wa ubalozi. Miezi miwili baadae aliuliwa kikatili. Kwanini? 
Ni kweli kwamba Malcolm alikuwa na ugomvi mkubwa na viongozi wa kundi la dini ambalo aliachana nalo mapema mwaka 64. Kuna wanaosema ugomvi huo ni moja ya chanzo cha kuuliwa. Ni kweli alipigwa risasi na watu wanaosemekama walikuwa kwenye kundi hilo la kidini; ingiwa hilo halijathibitishwa kikamilifu. Kuna wengi wanaamini aliuliwa na watu wa serikali. Hata hivyo, mtu pekee aliyeshikiliwa kwa kumuua Malcolm X, Thomas Hagan, aliachiwa jela mwaka 2010. Kitu gani kinaweza kufanya muuaji wa Malcolm X aachiwe huru kama serikali haina mkono? Picha ya mwili wa Malcolm X akiwa amekufa, inaonyesha matundu matatu ya risasi kwenye sehemu ya moyo; aliyefyatua risasi alikuwa na ujuzi mkubwa. Kuna maswahili mengi ambayo hayana majibu rahisi nani alimuua na kwasababu gani. Lakini ni wazi kwamba tangu alipotembelea Afrika mwaka 64 na alipoanza kujiunga na viongozi wa Afrika, Malcolm alikuja kuwa tishio kubwa kwa serikali ya Marekani. Harakati zake alipoenda kwenye mkutano wa OAU za kujaribu kushawishi nchi za Afrika zijaribu kusaidia mapambano ya watu weusi Marekani, zilianza kufanya kazi mwishoni wa mwaka 64. Nchi za Afrika zililaani vitendo vya Marekani kwenye mkutano wa umoja wa mataifa New York mwezi wa 12. Mashambulizi hayo dhidi ya Marekani huko umoja wa mataifa yaliiaibisha nchi hio. Hamna shaka kwamba juhudi za Malcolm X zilikuwa zinaanza kufanya kazi. Na ni kwasababu hio serikali ya Marekani ilianza kumuona yeye kama adui namba moja! 

Jet Magazine "Words of the Week," November 11, 1959 Kanyama Chiume

Jet Magazine "Words of the Week," November 11, 1959 Kanyama Chiume

Selected quotes by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

Selected quotes by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere
A light was turned on sometime in April 13, 1922. Here are a few selected quotes by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere. That light continues to shine!

"The man whose contributions merits at footnote in the history of United Africa will deserve more of the future, than he whose obstinacy, fear or pride, prevents or delays the day when that history can be written."
“We in Tanganyika believe that only a wicked man can make color the criterion for human rights. Here we intend to build a country in which the color of a person’s skin or the texture of his hair will be as irrelevant to his rights and his duties as a citizen as it is irrelevant to his value in the eyes of God.” (1960)
“It is this freedom to search which is the starting point of all progress of all mistakes which man has made and will make for ever. Historical changes such as the Renaissance, Reformation, Capitalism, Socialism or Nationalism were corrections of history, which in turn, were corrected again. (1961)
“In my opinion, what we have achieved-although it is important-is still very little. We cannot, the African, the Black people on this planet, will not play their real role, will not contribute to the march of human history until we are liberated, which we are not. I’m not liberated. I can’t be liberated simply because I am the head of state of an independent African state. This is not possible. I can only be liberated when the people of Africa, when African people, are liberated. And they are not liberated now. We have got to work for this liberation of the person. This means the ending of exploitation, the ending of all kinds of inequalities. We’ve got to work for this.” (1973)
“When a Bokassa behaves as a Bokassa I feel bad. When Amin behaves as Amin I feel bad. There is a sense in which I am also like those blessed racists who point to Bokassa or Amin and say. “Ah! Look at Black Africa.” But they don’t point to Hitler and say, “This is a white man.” Or to Salazar or Franco and say, “This is a white man.” They simply say. “This is Hitler. This is Franco. This is Salazar.” But with Africa they generalize. They say, “See what is happening in Africa?” I could just as easily point to Portugal and say, “See what is happening in Europe?” So you could say what does Bokassa represent? Bokassa is a tyrant. Amin is a tyrant. And the world has had tyrants. They never started in Africa. Bokassa’s hero was Napoleon. Amin quoted Hitler. So what is peculiar about the tyrant in Africa?... My real problem, what I’ve been complaining about, is the tendency among Africans to feel shy in front of these tyrants, to not denounce them as tyrants. An African feels ashamed when he sees a tyrant instead of being angry.” (1979

How Tanganyika and Zanzibar Became Tanzania

How Tanganyika and Zanzibar Became Tanzania

The story of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar has puzzled many Tanzanians and others alike. Pieces of this puzzle continue to elude most of the public while the few remaining witnesses maintain their silence. Lack of information has led many to conspiracy theories, rumors, and outright lies. There are those who credit the West for the whole scheme. Others see Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Abeid Amani Karume as the masterminds each motivated by different factors. Was it African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, Communism, political survival? All these elements factored into a web of events that led to the Union.
The Zanzibar Revolution of January 12, 1964 changed everything. ASP had the Presidency for the first time even though they had majority support from voters in the first elections in 1957 and the last elections of 1963. Zanzibar was ruled by a loose alliance of different factions under President Karume starting in mid-January 1964. A Revolutionary Council made up of different factions wrestled for power. Karume was caught in a conundrum. He presided over a Council made up of individuals, some of whom had a different agenda. Meanwhile a little over thirty six Kilometers away in mainland Tanganyika, a nervous government attempted to provide assistance to stabilize the situation. Tanganyika flew in 150 police in January and more police were sent later. The Tanganyika police were there to help maintain order and lend support to Karume. Nyerere and Karume worked out a plan to remove John Okello from the island. The plan worked out as planned and Okello was out of Zanzibar for good March of 1964. The challenges mounted up against Karume in the month of March. Tanganyika leaders worried that Karume’s days in office were numbered. 
The web of intrigue and conspiracies kept getting wider in the two months proceeding the Revolution. This web entangled Cold War politics, African nationalism, Communism, Pan Africanism, and sheer political survival, in one messy bundle. Abdulrahman Babu was a busy man by all accounts. He had managed to secure support from Communist countries. Money and weapons poured into the island. Babu and former members of his UMMA Party eventually came to be seen as a threat to Karume, and ultimately, Tanganyika. To make matters worse, reports of plots by supporters of the former government and the Sultan kept coming. Karume realized that his very political survival was in jeopardy. He increasingly turned to Tanganyika for support. 
The relationship between Karume and Nyerere, TANU and ASP, was not new in 1964, nor was the idea of establishing some form of political association between the two countries. Nyerere was invited by the Zanzibar African Association in 1956 and again in 1957 during a meeting that brought together members of the Shirazi Party and the African Association. TANU increased assistance to ASP following complete break down of talks with ZNP by 1960. As for political unity, the idea of a regional federation was presented at the PAFMECA conference in 1958 and tabled for another time. Karume, Babu, and Ali Muhsin from Zanzibar were present. Nyerere pushed for the idea of federation that included Zanzibar in 1960 and 1961. Some ASP and TANU leaders discussed the possibility of either a “federation” or “union” between their two countries in 1962. Oscar Kambona, then a Minister in 1963, reported an approach by ASP leaders with a proposal for union in January of 1963. Yet it was the circumstances in the aftermath of the January 1964 Revolution that led leaders to take steps to cement the idea.
Nyerere had his own reasons for pushing for unity and embracing the idea of a union. He pushed for a political unification of East Africa since 1960. Most of his efforts were placed in negotiations for an East African Federation. The efforts had failed by the end of 1963. There was still a glimmer of hope; East African leaders wanted to give the idea another try in April of 1964. Nyerere flew to Nairobi in April 10th to meet with Jommo Kenyatta and Milton Obote to discuss federation. It was clear by the following day, April 11, that the talks had failed to produce any positive results. Nyerere tried to convince his colleagues to help in Zanzibar, but his plea were mostly ignored. The failure of the East African Federation talks was a turning point for Tanganyika.
Tanganyika government watched carefully the deteriorating situation in Zanzibar in the months of February and March of 1964. Nyerere remarked in March 28 that he “did not know if the present Government of Zanzibar would last.” The situation in Zanzibar deteriorated further in April. Nyerere expressed deep anxiety about the course of events in Zanzibar in April 9; he mentions a report of plans by former Sultan and his supporters to launch a coup with assistance from Arab countries. Karume, Kambona and Nyerere met just before Nyerere left for the East African Summit of April 10; it appears that discussions of a possible union or federation took place. Yet Karume refused to take part in the East African Federation talks in Nairobi. Karume's grip on power in Zanzibar was slowly slipping away.
Babu and his supporters came to be seen as a threat. Money and weapons kept pouring into Zanzibar. The small number of Tanganyika police equipped with outdated rifles were no match to the automatic weapons from USSR and China. Alarm bells started ringing in the capitols of Western nations. Washington and London jumped into action. Repeat of a “Cuba” in East Africa was intolerable. US and UK representatives urged Nyerere to take action; they approached Kenya and Uganda to see what they can do to help remove what they saw as a Communist threat in the island. The fears stemmed from the idea that Zanzibar could be used as a launching pad for Communist infiltration into East Africa. With all the pitching and maneuvering, the final decision was in the hands of Nyerere and Karume. What ultimately emerged was an African solution motivated by a multiple factors. 
Kambona was authorized to embark on a secret project starting around the second week of April 1964. Kambona worked closely with a Zanzibar counterpart Kassim Hanga. It was ultimately Kambona and Hanga who did most of the ground work for securing an agreement and implementing the Union. Kambona and Hanga were close friends and had been room mates during their school days in London. Kambona mentioned talks of a “union” or “federation” taking place on April 17. He was asked if he needed any help for his “project?” He replied “If this doesn’t work, I’ll let you know at once.” Kambona had just sent one of his trusted friends on the morning of April 17 to Zanzibar to see what was needed to move the negotiations forward. Karume gave a tentative agreement provided that certain demands were met. 
The situation in Zanzibar in mid-April had turned for the worst. A Security Organization under Ibrahim Makungu received a tip about a possible plot to overthrow Karume. Makungu and the Police Commissioner, Eddington Kissasi, jumped into action and made the initial arrests. Kissasi reportedly had mainland roots. Ali Mahfoudh and Yusuf Himid joined in on the arrests afterwards. More than 150 people were arrested. Some of those arrested were badly mistreated. The threat to Karume’s position was real. 
Reports reached Nyerere that some of the people arrested on suspicion of involvement in the coup were mistreated. He remarked on April 17 that “Zanzibaris are getting wilder and wilder and it seems as if no one was in control.” He at this point wanted to withdraw Tanganyika police from Zanzibar. An order was issued sometime between April 18 and 19th to withdraw Tanganyika police from Zanzibar. Karume flew to Dar es Salaam on April 19th immediately after hearing about the order to withdraw. He went straight to the State House. Details of the discussion between Nyerere and Karume on that day are not clear. However, it is possible to deduce from the actions taken afterwards. Tanganyika agreed to send more police officers to Zanzibar. More Tanganyika police were sent to Zanzibar sometime between April 23 and 24th. The two leaders appear to have reached an agreement on the Union on the 19th.
A flurry of flights between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar took place between April 20 and 21st. Hanga flew to Dar es Salaam on April 21st. It was important to outline details of the agreement and sign it while Babu was away. As far back as March 17, 1964 when Babu was finalizing plans to travel to Asia, one particular Western power was busy trying to extend his visit to keep him away from Zanzibar. One report states “…Since Babu planning visit Indonesia, probably returning via Karachi…may wish suggest to Malaysians that they extend invitation…” A senior Tanganyika official remarked at the time that he was convinced Babu was plotting with the Chinese over the Government of Zanzibar. Ministers representing Tanganyika and Zanzibar had reached an agreement by the end of the day in April 21. Nyerere, Kambona, and Job Lusinde flew to Zanzibar on April 22. Nyerere and Karume held a private meeting before coming out to meet cheering Ministers and government officials. The two leaders signed Articles of the Union. This was the first step. More challenges were to come.
Nyerere remaked on April 23rd that he was worried of possible negative reactions from some members of the Revolutionary Council and a possible armed resistance. He pointed out that since the Council authorized Karume to sign the Declaration of Union, then he was confident it would agree to ratify it. The Council met to deliberate on the Union on April 23rd. According to one observer who was present, the “Union idea had a rough passage in the Revolutionary Council." Karume and Hanga pushed hard. Out of the 20 members present during the meeting, 10 members including Yusuf Himid initially abstained during the voting. Karume threatened the Council with intervention from Kenya, Uganda, and finally the UK. This was no empty threat, at least when it came to the UK. Documents from the UK reveals an elaborate plan to invade Zanzibar in March of 1964. The British military sketched out an elaborate Top Secret plan to invade Zanzibar. The plan involved sending paratroopers to Zanzibar with the approval of the British Prime Minister. It is not clear if Karume was aware of details of the British plan in April, but his threat to the Council suggests he may have been aware of it. At one point, Karume told Salim Rashid he was “nothing but a schoolboy.” At least one report claims that Hassan Moyo was conspicuously absent during the deliberations. Most reports suggest that the Council ultimately ratified articles of the Union. 
Babu left Karachi on April 25 for Zanzibar. He was asked about the union while en-route to Zanzibar. He told reporters in Nairobi that the “Union was no surprise to him. It was planned before revolution, even before independence.” Babu was aware of talks of a union before and shortly after the revolution. However, he was not involved in the talks that led to it during the third week of April 1964. He arrived back in Zanzibar with little fanfare. Only Salim Rashid was there at the airport to meet him. He would later hold a secret meeting on Sunday April 26 with Moyo, Twala, and Ali Mwinyi Gogo. Not much could be done to torpedo the union at this point. The Union marked the end to the political ambitions of many of those who posed a challenge to Karume.
Karume was comfortable to talk about the union during the Idd Baraza in April 24, 1964. He gave a speech in Kiswahili. Here is what he had to say: “Tanganyika and Zanzibar are neighbors geographically, historically, and linguistically; they are neighbors by custom and culture, and by politics. The friendship between the Afro-Shirazi party and TANU is well known to you all. The friendship between the leaders of these two Parties did not start yesterday….” It was a remarkable turn of events. His position of power in Zanzibar was sealed.
Talking to representative of a Western nation in April 28, 1964, Nyerere remarked that United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was a “miracle so good I can’t believe it.” He went on to say “I’ve worked one miracle but I can’t go on working miracles alone….” The very idea of establishing either a “union” or “federation” was first and foremost an African idea. Even the CIA point man in Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, remarked in May of 1964: “US Government remained on sidelines during merger recognizing that this was an African initiative..” Indeed, the idea of a Union and steps taken to initiate a union came from within Africa. The West picked up on the idea and pushed it for their reasons; they calculated that it was in their interests to make sure the idea came to fruition. Yet the path to a union and the final decision laid with the African leaders involved. African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, fears of a counter-coup, the sheer determination to maintain a grip on power, all these factors came together to shape the environment that led to the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April of 1964.
© Azaria Mbughuni

The Zanzibar Revolution

The Zanzibar Revolution

On the morning of Saturday, January 11, 1964, Mr. Bott, the Head of the Zanzibar Special Branch, received a call from Abeid Amani Karume to meet him. Mr. Bott went to the ASP Headquarters immediately. He was conducted into a room where Karume, Jumbe and Saleh Sadalla were sitting. Karume told Bott that he "heard rumors from a woman whom they did not know... there might be trouble in Zanzibar that day." ASP was spilling out the beans to the government before the Revolution. Why? 
The story of the Zanzibar Revolution is complicated, to say the least. Secrecy remains the order of the day. Countless books and articles have posited different ideas about exactly what took place in January 12, 1964. The ever elusive facts continue to evade the pens and papers of innumerable authors.
The Zanzibar Prime Minister, Muhammad Shamte, the Sultan, and other government officials were informed in advance of the troubles to come. Shamte ordered the police patrols to be increased and to remain vigilant against a planned attack.
Large number of additional patrols were mounted, all Special Branch officers were sent out, and road blocks were set up during the day. More police were placed at the Sultan's palace and other important buildings. Ali Muhsin was informed about the plot and four police were sent to guard his home. News of the planned Revolution was no secret hours before it was supposed to be launched. A low level member of the ASP told an informer that there were plans to take over the police armoury. One of the most important operations of the Revolution-capturing weapons from the armoury-was known to the government officials in advance. Shamte was aware that there were plans to attack Arabs at night. The government had advance warning of the Revolution. Attempts by the Zanzibar intelligence apparatus to collect intelligence of the plot between the morning of January 11 and just before midnight was a total failure, or so it appears. The result was that the government underestimated the dangers and failed to take appropriate measures to prevent it. This was a colossal failure with dire consequences. 
The government war against the UMMA party backfired in the worst ways. A series of events in the beginning of April, 1964 set the ball rolling for Babu and members of the UMMA party. On April 9, 1964, Abdulrahman Babu's daughter was run over by a car and killed; it was a tragic accident. The police searched for Babu everywhere, but could not find him. Babu and Hanga had escaped at night to Dar es Salaam. The government of Shamte raided UMMA offices and took out documents. The police also raided Babu's home and found a small handgun. Among the documents they found was a list with almost 1,000 members. The list included a large number of government employees. They also found Babu's diary written in Peking, China. It was a treasure trove of intelligence for the ZNP/ZPPP government and the colonial officials. Babu had escaped just before the police showed up at his house. He was alerted about the police search and knew of the troubles to come. Men trained in Cuba were returning to Zanzibar in small numbers at a time. Babu and the UMMA party were up to something.
Shamte and his government implemented a policy of "Zanzibarisation" of the police force shortly after coming to power. The Zanzibar government made the decision in November 1963 to remove all non-Zanzibari from the police force. The British colonial government had not recruited from mainland since 1959. Yet all the Inspectors and Senior NCOs were mainlander (from East and Southern Africa) with four to thirty five years experience in the police force. Of the 270 men in the force, only 90 were from Tanganyika, the rest were from South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, and elsewhere. Among the highly experienced police working for the Zanzibar government was the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Eddington Kissasi from Tanganyika. Ali Muhsin announced in numerous public events that "neither he nor the Government fully relied on the loyalty of the mainland members of the police force or indeed of any non-Zanzibaris members." This was a dangerous statement. Meanwhile plans were being made to bring in "advisors" from Egypt. It is obvious that Shamte, Muhsin, and the govenrment of Zanzibar had made a decision to embark on a policy of discrimination against mainlanders. It was a mistake they would pay dearly.
The ASP organized a large party on the evening of January 11, 1964 at their headquarters. Large number of ASP members and supporters attended the party. Some of the men were told to go to Seamens Union Club at Miembeni after the party was over. There they were met and addressed by Karume, Jumbe and Babu. Babu who was supposedly in Dar es Salaam, had slipped secretly to Zanzibar at night and then left for Dar es Salaam in the wee hours of the morning. At the meeting, the three leaders told the men not to be afraid to die. Karume did not hang around long; he got on a boat early morning and left for Dar es Salaam. Karume would not return to Zanzibar until much later on the evening of January 12th with about 12 armed men on a boat owned and operated by an Israeli named Mishah Feinsilber. Oscar Kambona was there to see them off. 
John Okello was a...
© Azaria Mbughuni