How Tanganyika and Zanzibar Became Tanzania

How Tanganyika and Zanzibar Became Tanzania

The story of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar has puzzled many Tanzanians and others alike. Pieces of this puzzle continue to elude most of the public while the few remaining witnesses maintain their silence. Lack of information has led many to conspiracy theories, rumors, and outright lies. There are those who credit the West for the whole scheme. Others see Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Abeid Amani Karume as the masterminds each motivated by different factors. Was it African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, Communism, political survival? All these elements factored into a web of events that led to the Union.

The Zanzibar Revolution of January 12, 1964 changed everything. ASP had the Presidency for the first time even though they had majority support from voters in the first elections in 1957 and the last elections of 1963. Zanzibar was ruled by a loose alliance of different factions under President Karume starting in mid-January 1964. A Revolutionary Council made up of different factions wrestled for power. Karume was caught in a conundrum. He presided over a Council made up of individuals, some of whom had a different agenda. Meanwhile a little over thirty six Kilometers away in mainland Tanganyika, a nervous government attempted to provide assistance to stabilize the situation. Tanganyika flew in 150 police in January and more police were sent later. The Tanganyika police were there to help maintain order and lend support to Karume. Nyerere and Karume worked out a plan to remove John Okello from the island. The plan worked out as planned and Okello was out of Zanzibar for good March of 1964. The challenges mounted up against Karume in the month of March. Tanganyika leaders worried that Karume’s days in office were numbered. 

The web of intrigue and conspiracies kept getting wider in the two months proceeding the Revolution. This web entangled Cold War politics, African nationalism, Communism, Pan Africanism, and sheer political survival, in one messy bundle. Abdulrahman Babu was a busy man by all accounts. He had managed to secure support from Communist countries. Money and weapons poured into the island. Babu and former members of his UMMA Party eventually came to be seen as a threat to Karume, and ultimately, Tanganyika. To make matters worse, reports of plots by supporters of the former government and the Sultan kept coming. Karume realized that his very political survival was in jeopardy. He increasingly turned to Tanganyika for support. 

The relationship between Karume and Nyerere, TANU and ASP, was not new in 1964, nor was the idea of establishing some form of political association between the two countries. Nyerere was invited by the Zanzibar African Association in 1956 and again in 1957 during a meeting that brought together members of the Shirazi Party and the African Association. TANU increased assistance to ASP following complete break down of talks with ZNP by 1960. As for political unity, the idea of a regional federation was presented at the PAFMECA conference in 1958 and tabled for another time. Karume, Babu, and Ali Muhsin from Zanzibar were present. Nyerere pushed for the idea of federation that included Zanzibar in 1960 and 1961. Some ASP and TANU leaders discussed the possibility of either a “federation” or “union” between their two countries in 1962. Oscar Kambona, then a Minister in 1963, reported an approach by ASP leaders with a proposal for union in January of 1963. Yet it was the circumstances in the aftermath of the January 1964 Revolution that led leaders to take steps to cement the idea.

Nyerere had his own reasons for pushing for unity and embracing the idea of a union. He pushed for a political unification of East Africa since 1960. Most of his efforts were placed in negotiations for an East African Federation. The efforts had failed by the end of 1963. There was still a glimmer of hope; East African leaders wanted to give the idea another try in April of 1964. Nyerere flew to Nairobi in April 10th to meet with Jommo Kenyatta and Milton Obote to discuss federation. It was clear by the following day, April 11, that the talks had failed to produce any positive results. Nyerere tried to convince his colleagues to help in Zanzibar, but his plea were mostly ignored. The failure of the East African Federation talks was a turning point for Tanganyika.

Tanganyika government watched carefully the deteriorating situation in Zanzibar in the months of February and March of 1964. Nyerere remarked in March 28 that he “did not know if the present Government of Zanzibar would last.” The situation in Zanzibar deteriorated further in April. Nyerere expressed deep anxiety about the course of events in Zanzibar in April 9; he mentions a report of plans by former Sultan and his supporters to launch a coup with assistance from Arab countries. Karume, Kambona and Nyerere met just before Nyerere left for the East African Summit of April 10; it appears that discussions of a possible union or federation took place. Yet Karume refused to take part in the East African Federation talks in Nairobi. Karume's grip on power in Zanzibar was slowly slipping away.

Babu and his supporters came to be seen as a threat. Money and weapons kept pouring into Zanzibar. The small number of Tanganyika police equipped with outdated rifles were no match to the automatic weapons from USSR and China. Alarm bells started ringing in the capitols of Western nations. Washington and London jumped into action. Repeat of a “Cuba” in East Africa was intolerable. US and UK representatives urged Nyerere to take action; they approached Kenya and Uganda to see what they can do to help remove what they saw as a Communist threat in the island. The fears stemmed from the idea that Zanzibar could be used as a launching pad for Communist infiltration into East Africa. With all the pitching and maneuvering, the final decision was in the hands of Nyerere and Karume. What ultimately emerged was an African solution motivated by a multiple factors. 

Kambona was authorized to embark on a secret project starting around the second week of April 1964. Kambona worked closely with a Zanzibar counterpart Kassim Hanga. It was ultimately Kambona and Hanga who did most of the ground work for securing an agreement and implementing the Union. Kambona and Hanga were close friends and had been room mates during their school days in London. Kambona mentioned talks of a “union” or “federation” taking place on April 17. He was asked if he needed any help for his “project?” He replied “If this doesn’t work, I’ll let you know at once.” Kambona had just sent one of his trusted friends on the morning of April 17 to Zanzibar to see what was needed to move the negotiations forward. Karume gave a tentative agreement provided that certain demands were met. 

The situation in Zanzibar in mid-April had turned for the worst. A Security Organization under Ibrahim Makungu received a tip about a possible plot to overthrow Karume. Makungu and the Police Commissioner, Eddington Kissasi, jumped into action and made the initial arrests. Kissasi reportedly had mainland roots. Ali Mahfoudh and Yusuf Himid joined in on the arrests afterwards. More than 150 people were arrested. Some of those arrested were badly mistreated. The threat to Karume’s position was real. 

Reports reached Nyerere that some of the people arrested on suspicion of involvement in the coup were mistreated. He remarked on April 17 that “Zanzibaris are getting wilder and wilder and it seems as if no one was in control.” He at this point wanted to withdraw Tanganyika police from Zanzibar. An order was issued sometime between April 18 and 19th to withdraw Tanganyika police from Zanzibar. Karume flew to Dar es Salaam on April 19th immediately after hearing about the order to withdraw. He went straight to the State House. Details of the discussion between Nyerere and Karume on that day are not clear. However, it is possible to deduce from the actions taken afterwards. Tanganyika agreed to send more police officers to Zanzibar. More Tanganyika police were sent to Zanzibar sometime between April 23 and 24th. The two leaders appear to have reached an agreement on the Union on the 19th.

A flurry of flights between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar took place between April 20 and 21st. Hanga flew to Dar es Salaam on April 21st. It was important to outline details of the agreement and sign it while Babu was away. As far back as March 17, 1964 when Babu was finalizing plans to travel to Asia, one particular Western power was busy trying to extend his visit to keep him away from Zanzibar. One report states “…Since Babu planning visit Indonesia, probably returning via Karachi…may wish suggest to Malaysians that they extend invitation…” A senior Tanganyika official remarked at the time that he was convinced Babu was plotting with the Chinese over the Government of Zanzibar. Ministers representing Tanganyika and Zanzibar had reached an agreement by the end of the day in April 21. Nyerere, Kambona, and Job Lusinde flew to Zanzibar on April 22. Nyerere and Karume held a private meeting before coming out to meet cheering Ministers and government officials. The two leaders signed Articles of the Union. This was the first step. More challenges were to come.

Nyerere remaked on April 23rd that he was worried of possible negative reactions from some members of the Revolutionary Council and a possible armed resistance. He pointed out that since the Council authorized Karume to sign the Declaration of Union, then he was confident it would agree to ratify it. The Council met to deliberate on the Union on April 23rd. According to one observer who was present, the “Union idea had a rough passage in the Revolutionary Council." Karume and Hanga pushed hard. Out of the 20 members present during the meeting, 10 members including Yusuf Himid initially abstained during the voting. Karume threatened the Council with intervention from Kenya, Uganda, and finally the UK. This was no empty threat, at least when it came to the UK. Documents from the UK reveals an elaborate plan to invade Zanzibar in March of 1964. The British military sketched out an elaborate Top Secret plan to invade Zanzibar. The plan involved sending paratroopers to Zanzibar with the approval of the British Prime Minister. It is not clear if Karume was aware of details of the British plan in April, but his threat to the Council suggests he may have been aware of it. At one point, Karume told Salim Rashid he was “nothing but a schoolboy.” At least one report claims that Hassan Moyo was conspicuously absent during the deliberations. Most reports suggest that the Council ultimately ratified articles of the Union. 

Babu left Karachi on April 25 for Zanzibar. He was asked about the union while en-route to Zanzibar. He told reporters in Nairobi that the “Union was no surprise to him. It was planned before revolution, even before independence.” Babu was aware of talks of a union before and shortly after the revolution. However, he was not involved in the talks that led to it during the third week of April 1964. He arrived back in Zanzibar with little fanfare. Only Salim Rashid was there at the airport to meet him. He would later hold a secret meeting on Sunday April 26 with Moyo, Twala, and Ali Mwinyi Gogo. Not much could be done to torpedo the union at this point. The Union marked the end to the political ambitions of many of those who posed a challenge to Karume.

Karume was comfortable to talk about the union during the Idd Baraza in April 24, 1964. He gave a speech in Kiswahili. Here is what he had to say: “Tanganyika and Zanzibar are neighbors geographically, historically, and linguistically; they are neighbors by custom and culture, and by politics. The friendship between the Afro-Shirazi party and TANU is well known to you all. The friendship between the leaders of these two Parties did not start yesterday….” It was a remarkable turn of events. His position of power in Zanzibar was sealed.

Talking to representative of a Western nation in April 28, 1964, Nyerere remarked that United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was a “miracle so good I can’t believe it.” He went on to say “I’ve worked one miracle but I can’t go on working miracles alone….” The very idea of establishing either a “union” or “federation” was first and foremost an African idea. Even the CIA point man in Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, remarked in May of 1964: “US Government remained on sidelines during merger recognizing that this was an African initiative..” Indeed, the idea of a Union and steps taken to initiate a union came from within Africa. The West picked up on the idea and pushed it for their reasons; they calculated that it was in their interests to make sure the idea came to fruition. Yet the path to a union and the final decision laid with the African leaders involved. African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, fears of a counter-coup, the sheer determination to maintain a grip on power, all these factors came together to shape the environment that led to the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April of 1964.
© Azaria Mbughuni